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The growing connectivity of cyber-physical systems (CPSes) has led to an 
increased concern over the ability of cyber-attacks to inflict physical damage. Current 
cybersecurity measures focus on preventing attacks from penetrating control supervisory 
networks. These reactive techniques, however, are often plagued with vulnerabilities and 
zero-day exploits. Embedded processors in CPS field devices often possess little security 
of their own, and are easily exploited once the network is penetrated. In response, 
researchers at Georgia Tech and Virginia Tech have proposed a Trustworthy Autonomic 
Interface Guardian Architecture (TAIGA), which monitors communication between the 
embedded controller and physical process. This autonomic architecture provides the 
physical process with a last line of defense against cyber-attacks by switching process 
control to a trusted backup controller if an attack causes a system specification violation.  
This thesis focuses on classifying the effects of cyberattacks on embedded 
controllers, evaluating TAIGA’s resilience against these attacks, and determining the 
applicability of TAIGA to other CPSes. This thesis identifies four possible outcomes of a 
cyber-attack on a CPS embedded processor. We then evaluate TAIGA’s mechanisms to 
defend against those attack outcomes, and verify TAIGA satisfies the listed trust 
requirements. Next, we discuss an implementation and the experimental results of 
TAIGA on a hazardous cargo transportation robot. Then, by making various 
modifications to the setup configuration, we are able to explore TAIGA’s ability to 
provide security and process protection to other CPSes with varying levels of autonomy 
or distributed components.   
1 
 
CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
With the promise to improve reliability, efficiency, and capability of physical 
processes, cyber-physical systems (CPSes) are integrating themselves into nearly every 
facet of modern society. CPSes are defined as systems that utilize some degree of 
computing to control or monitor a physical process.  
 
Figure 1: Generic cyber-physical system setup 
 
As shown in Figure 1, CPSes typically involve an embedded process controller, often 
referred to as a field device, directly connected to the physical process’s sensors and 
actuators. The embedded processor receives instructions from a supervisory network, 
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interfaces (HMIs), supervisory work stations, and external sensors. The supervisory 
network often permits remote access through corporate networks and internet 
connectivity. Applications of CPSes can be found in modern consumer electronics, 
aviation, medical devices, industrial automation, ground transportation, 
telecommunications, and power systems [1]. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) projects advances in CPSes will create entirely new markets with 
enormous economic impacts, and will be critical for national manufacturing 
competiveness. The effects of the resultant technologies have the potential to improve the 
overall quality of human life [2].  
As the applications of CPSes continue to increase, so does the potential for cyber-
attacks to cause system failures and result in physical damage, environmental impacts, 
financial losses, or human casualties [3]. In 2000, a disgruntled former contractor for 
Maroochy Water Services in Australia used radio transmitters in his car to release one 
million liters of raw sewage into nearby waterways [4]. In 2009, the Stuxnet worm spread 
through a USB stick is believed to have damaged centrifuges in Iran’s Natanz uranium 
enrichment facility [5]. In December 2014, attackers using a phishing campaign gained 
access to the network of a German steel mill and inflicted massive damage by improperly 
shutting down a blast furnace [6]. In July 2015, security experts wirelessly hacked the 
control systems of a Jeep and were able to override the driver’s controls [7].  
These and other similar attacks have exposed an urgent need to improve the 
security of CPSes to prevent them from inflicting physical harm [8]. Most CPS security 
efforts have focused on protecting the perimeter of supervisory networks controlling the 
embedded processors. Security measures include typical IT security firewalls, anti-virus 
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packages, data encryption, access control, and user authentication. Once an attacker 
penetrates the supervisory network, however, they often find little or no security or 
validation schemes on the embedded process controller.  With the ability to modify the 
behavior of the embedded processor, the attacker is able to modify the behavior of the 
physical process [9].  
In an effort to improve CPS security, researchers from Georgia Tech and Virginia 
Tech proposed the Trustworthy Autonomic Interface Guardian Architecture (TAIGA) 
[10]. In this thesis, we examine the implementation criterion for TAIGA, evaluate its 
effectiveness, and determine its applicability to other systems.  
1.1 Thesis Overview 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses CPS 
adversaries and cyber-attack vectors, categorizes the possible effects of various attacks, 
and discusses other work related to CPS security. Next, Chapter 3 examines TAIGA’s 
mechanisms for counteracting cyber-attacks and satisfying the trust requirements. 
Chapter 4 discusses the implementation and experimental results of this scheme on a 
hazardous cargo transportation robot. In Chapter 5, we make slight modifications to the 
experimental setup to develop a set of system conditions that determine what benefits 
TAIGA can provide to other CPSes with varying levels of autonomy and distributed 
components. The final Chapter provides a summary of the thesis, the impacts of the 
research, and suggestions for future work.   
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CHAPTER 2  
CYBER-THREATS TO CPSES 
 
Cybersecurity and control design have historically been treated as independent 
fields, and developed with little consideration for one another [11]. Traditional 
cybersecurity fails to account for the interdependencies between the cyber and physical 
systems [12]. Likewise, control design monitors for faults in the physical processes, but 
often ignores the possibilities of cyber-threats [13]. The increasing demands for CPSes to 
offer remote access and monitoring resulted in a makeshift mix between the two fields.  
Traditional IT security technologies, previously designed to protect the exchange of 
information between cyber components, are being deployed to protect physical processes 
on CPS networks [14]. Due to the scale and complexity of many CPS networks, 
preventing infiltration is far from guaranteed.  Furthermore, example exploits such as 
Heartbleed have demonstrated that even supposedly secure communication protocols 
may be compromised by zero-day exploits and implementation flaws. As a result, 
traditional cyber perimeter defenses are often considered to be a reactive to newly 
discovered threats, and cannot promise protection against unknown exploits [10]. 
In addition, these security techniques assume trust and security in the embedded 
field devices controlling the physical process. They assume these devices are “protected” 
by the network, and thus will not be victim to Trojans, or code modification [15]. These 
devices, however, often include little security measures of their own. Furthermore, the 
devices are often built using custom or proprietary protocols, hardware description 
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languages, and third-party cores. These sources can easily hide unintentional or 
intentional Trojan behaviors and vulnerabilities [16].  
Cárdenas’ adversary model lists multiple possible CPS cyber-attackers: 
cybercriminals, disgruntled employees, terrorist groups, and nation states [17]. While 
each group can inflict harm to CPSes, their methods of attacks vary. For example, 
cybercriminals often target any available computer in search of sensitive financial 
information, or to generate spam. Even though their malicious programs are not designed 
to target CPSes, cybercriminal malware may infect control systems using common IT 
components, and produce unintended side-effects. For example, in 2003 the Slammer 
worm targeting IT components shut down the safety protection system at the Davis-Besse 
nuclear power station in Ohio for several hours [18]. In contrast to cyber criminals, 
disgruntled employees represent a different risk to CPSes.  In addition to possessing 
insider knowledge of the process and its controllers, current employees often have 
authorized system access. This allows them to bypass many perimeter security measures, 
and launch system-specific attacks. Likewise, terrorist and organized criminal groups 
may also create system-specific attacks directed at CPSes. Groups may aim to cause 
maximum physical damage as quickly as possible, or hold the system hostage and 
demand a ransom. Cyber-attacks are incentivizing to terrorist organizations since they are 
lower-risk and easier to execute than physical attacks. These incentives may also 
encourage nation states to invest in CPS attack technologies. Because of their available 
resources, nation state created attacks are often highly sophisticated, and may be designed 




2.1 Cyber-Attack Outcomes on Process Controllers 
Cyber-attacks may take the form of network intrusions, Trojans, malware, 
malicious updates, code injection, memory modification, denial-of-service attacks, real-
time hijacking, or similar attack-vectors [20]. Such attacks may originate from a remote 
network, be launched from the supervisory network, placed directly in the process 
controller itself, or hidden in embedded sensor logic. Many of these attacks include 
stealth components to report the process as operating normally for the duration of the 
attack. Yet despite the numerous CPS attack vectors, most attacks affect the process 
controller in similar fashions [21]. Regardless of the attack vector, the effect on the 
compromised controller can be categorized into four main effect groups as summarized in 
Table 1.  
Table 1: Cyber-attack outcomes on process controllers 
Effect on Embedded Controller Example Attack Vectors 
Controller Non-Functional - controller 
stops functioning entirely  
Malware, malicious updates 
Controller Incorrect - controller issues 
incorrect, invalid, or shuffled commands 
Network intrusions, Trojan logic, code 
injection, memory modification 
Controller  DoS - controller issues many 
unnecessary or surreptitious commands 
Denial-of-service  
Malicious Controller - controller issues 
intelligent commands to degrade or 
damage the process 
Real-time hijacking, specially tailored 
malware 
 
The first possible attack outcome, Controller Non-Functional, occurs when the 
embedded controller stops functioning entirely. This can occur as a result of simple low-
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knowledge malware or malicious updates which delete data or corrupt programs. 
Processes lacking physical safety interlocks may continue to operate unsafely until the 
process is damaged or destroyed.   
The second attack outcome, Controller Incorrect, arises when the controller still 
appears to function, however it exhibits occasional erroneous or surreptitious behavior. 
This type of behavior is often the result of low-knowledge network intrusions, difficult to 
detect Trojan logic, code injection, or memory injection attacks [22]. The process may 
exhibit strange behavior and reduced efficiency, and may eventually result in physical 
process damage.  
A third attack outcome, Controller  DoS, results when the controller attempts to 
act on or issues numerous useless commands. Such an outcome is typically the work of a 
denial-of-service attack. The injected commands monopolize computing and 
communication resources, delaying or overwriting valid commands. The command 
disruption may result in physical damage.  
The final outcome of an attack on the embedded processor, Malicious Controller, 
occurs when a knowledgeable attacker commandeers process control. This may be the 
result of real-time hijacking or specially tailored malware. In either case, the attacker is 
usually knowledgeable enough about the system to quickly drive the process to 
destruction. 
2.2 Related Work 
As awareness of CPS security issues continues to grow, so does research into the 
field. Because CPS security is a complex issue, it cannot be solved with a single simple 
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solution, but rather requires research into solving a broad field of challenges [23]. As a 
result, studies in the field often involve very different focuses, such as supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) security, secure communication protocols, 
specialized device firewalls, resilient control algorithms, intrusion detections techniques, 
authentication schemes, and hardware configurations [12]. While the discussion of CPS 
security techniques in this section is by no means exhaustive, it provides an insight into 
the types of efforts working towards securing CPSes.    
 For example, some researchers have focused on developing control system models 
that account for the possibility of cyber-attacks. Cárdenas proposed a resilient control 
system methodology for systems at risk of denial-of-service (DoS) or deception attacks 
against their sensors. The framework adds several adversary terms into the traditional 
state-space model, and uses knowledge of the physical system as a method of detecting 
cyber-attacks. The technique provides criteria under which the system may operate safely 
for the duration of the attacks [24] [25]. In some cases, developing the complex physical 
system models required is not always possible. In response, the proposed Cross 
Correlation technique was developed to also handle injection attacks without the need for 
a precise system model. The technique relies on trusted sensors to provide sufficient 
information to determine if an injection attack is occurring [26] [27]. Both designs, 
however, fail to account for the possibility of an attack directly targeting the process 
controller in which the well-designed control algorithm is modified.     
Other control-theory examples include Sha’s Simplex and L1Simplex control 
architectures, which utilize a decision module to select the best output from multiple 
process controllers. The setups are designed to correct for controller errors and system 
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faults while allowing for real-time controller updates [28] [29]. The architecture, 
however, provides limited protection against cyber-threats as “the availability of the 
application controllers can be manually altered by the user through the user interface 
[30].” Attackers could modify all controllers, forcing the architecture to execute 
malicious commands.    
Other studies have focused on developing verification and testing techniques to 
formally analyze CPS security. For example, Cheminod presented an industrial control 
system (ICS) cyber analysis tool written in Prolog. The tool uses various details of the 
system’s network connection and known attack vectors to produce a cybersecurity model 
of the system which is used to analyze possible attacks [31].  Although useful, this 
software tool cannot detect previously unknown exploits not included in the security 
model.  
Another set of studies concentrate on preventing cyber-attack penetration through 
secure communication protocols designed to run large scale control networks. For 
instance, the Virtual Automation Networks (VAN) solution attempts to define network 
communication protocol in such a way that undesirable communication between devices 
can be detected and prevented [32]. Another example is The Scalable Group Key 
Management Protocol (SGKMP), which uses key management protocols specially 
designed to scale to large networks with many devices operating under limited bandwidth 
[33]. Similarly, the Advanced SCADA Key-Management Architecture (ASKMA) is 
designed to reduce the required computational resources required for field devices to 
store and use network keys [34].  
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Other research groups, in comparison, focus on designing trusted hardware or 
software architectures that protect a device’s critical functions even if other components 
are compromised.  For example, the built-in self-authentication (BISA) technique uses 
digitally signed filler cells to prevent and detect Trojans from occupying unused spaces in 
critical components [35]. Another approach is ARM’s TrustZone architecture, which 
partitions applications into either the normal world (NWorld) or the secure world 
(SWorld) resource groups based on their level of trust [36]. Another such technique uses 
a low-cost, tamper-resistant, trusted physical component known as a Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM). The TPM is often added as a means to secure cryptographic key 
functionality, endorsement services, critical data storage, and integrity measurements [37] 
[38]. TPMs can be used as the root-of-trust for systems such as Microsoft's Next-
Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB), which uses the TPM to fingerprint the 
system configuration on boot-up, and distribute trust [39].   
Further security approaches employ additional hardware to mitigate or detect cyber-
attacks. Barbareschi presents the possibility of using configurable field programmable 
gate arrays (FPGAs) to change the configuration of the control network to respond to 
cyber-attacks. CPS devices could automatically reconfigure to replace the functionality of 
lost devices, or change encryption techniques to dynamically react to shifting demands 
between performance and confidentiality [40]. Likewise, the Morph Onion-encryption 
Replication PRR HAL (MORPH) scheme uses FPGAs to constantly shift hardware 
component locations, making it difficult for Trojans to target specific functions [41]. In 
similar applications, FPGA lattice-based cryptography is being developed to provide low-
resource yet high performance FPGA device security [42]. Another CPS security 
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approach involves using a sensor array known as Intelligent Checkers to monitor the 
system’s health. The Intelligent Checkers safeguard themselves from cyber-attacks by 
offering only one-way outgoing communication. The Checkers help protect against 
stealth attacks by raising an audible and visual alarm to alert system operators if a system 
anomaly is detected [43]. Intelligent Checkers, however, are reliant on an external 
operator with the ability to both react quick enough, and to have the physical means to 
restore the affected system. 
2.2.1 TAIGA Prior Work 
Although the security measures above represent important developments for CPS 
security, most measures still possess vulnerabilities that can lead to eventual physical 
harm as the result of cyber-attacks. The TAIGA architecture uses an additional trusted 
hardware component to serve as a last line of defense to prevent physical harm. In this 
section we briefly discuss other works directly related to the development of TAIGA. 
The notion of using a hardware-implemented and formally verified controller to 
monitor and enforce application-specific logic is presented in [44]. The work introduces 
the high-level design flow for atomic guarded rule enforces. It also utilizes a Bluespec 
high-level language to provide abstractions for defining logic guards. Next, the use of the 
TAIGA prediction module was presented in [21]. In [45], the specification guards, 
switching logic, and back-up controller are implemented using high-level synthesis for C 
code. A method for formally analyzing and verifying the source code using Frama-C is 
presented. Later, TAIGA is discussed in an ICS setting for the first time in [46] and [47]. 
These works presented a secure method for updating TAIGA specification guards to 
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account for the plant’s actuators changing over time. TAIGA is then implemented onto a 
Zedboard, and an analysis of the required resources and added latency is provided.  
Chapter 2 of [10] presents the five trust requirements a device must satisfy to be 
considered trustworthy. It then uses the requirements to compare TAIGA with other trust-
based architectures to illustrate the trust advantages of TAIGA. The work also provides 
some preliminary experimental results using the Jonny-Five humanoid robot which later 




CHAPTER 3  
TAIGA 
 
The Trustworthy Autonomic Interface Guardian Architecture (TAIGA) is designed to 
guard against the four controller attack outcomes. TAIGA can therefore protect a 
physical process in the event of a cyber-attack on a CPS. The architecture is not specific 
to any one device, network, or process, so it can be adapted to many CPSes. 
TAIGA functions by acting as a man-in-the middle between the embedded processor 
and physical system as shown in Figure 2. It provides a last line of defense to protect the 
physical process by monitoring the commands issued by the process controller. Instead of 
bolstering controller perimeter defenses, TAIGA adds a physical trusted layer of 
resiliency between the controller and the physical process. If the actions of the primary 
embedded controller deviate from acceptable predicted actions, TAIGA switches control 
over to an onboard backup controller, which is physically inaccessible to the network. 
Although the overall architecture of each TAIGA implementation is similar, the exact 
guards and backup actions will vary depending on the application. In systems where 
TAIGA has enough state sensor information to sustain the process without the primary 
controller, the autonomic backup controller may appear to act identically to the primary 
controller, and the process would continue uninhibited, though remote access capabilities 
would be lost. In most applications, however, it may be more reasonable to have TAIGA 
safely reduce or shut down the physical process, preventing physical damage. To ensure 
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system performance is not degraded by adding TAIGA, the architecture calls for interface 
controllers implemented in hardware [46].  
 
Figure 2: High-level overview of TAIGA 
 
3.1 Detection and Mitigation of Attacks 
To protect against attacks on the embedded controller, TAIGA must be able to 
identify and guard against the four attack outcome categories. To recognize 
abnormalities, TAIGA is provided with a variation of the primary embedded controller’s 
control loop. It also stores the physical process’s sensor values to update an internal 
model and predict future values of the process.  
To detect possible attacks, TAIGA performs a series of logic checks as shown in Figure 
3. Each TAIGA loop begins by checking the action of the primary controller by reading 
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any commands received from the primary controller. The TAIGA loop will run even if no 
controller commands are received under the implied action of do nothing.   
 
Figure 3: TAIGA guard logic check flow process 
 
TAIGA first checks to see if the action violates a specification guard. 
Specification guards simply ensure that various parameters fall within specified ranges, 
such as the maximum speed of a motor, or pressure in a tank. If TAIGA detects that the 
command would violate a specification guard, it switches to its backup controller state. If 
the commands do not violate any specification guards, the command is then checked 
against operation guards. Operation guards are similar to specification guards, except that 
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they dynamically activate depending on the state of the physical process. For example, an 
autonomous automobile would reject commands to drive forward if it detected an object 
in front of it. If an operational guard is violated by the primary controller, TAIGA again 
switches to a backup control state. The final TAIGA check looks to see if the primary 
controller is neglecting any safety-critical actions. This is accomplished by checking the 
primary controller’s action with predicted actions by TAIGA’s version of the primary 
controller. This final check will trigger the backup controller if the primary controller is 
inactive or neglecting high priority commands.   
In many systems, the desired parameter values of the various guards may slowly 
change over time. For example, the maximum safe speed of a turbine may decline slowly 
over time as components begin to wear, but may increase again after performing 
maintenance. To account for slight changes in parameters, TAIGA permits a tightly 
regulated parameter update process as described in [46]. The encrypted process only 
allows updates within certain preset value ranges, preventing an attacker from bypassing 
the system.      
3.2 TAIGA’s Trust Requirements Satisfiability 
It is desirable to build a system to guard against the four possible attack outcomes 
on the embedded controller. It would be futile, however, if the guard system itself could 
be bypassed, or worse yet, the source of an attack. Any proposed guard system would 
need to designed, implemented, and validated such that the device can always be trusted. 
In order to place full trust in a guard system, it should satisfy five trust requirements 
(TRs) [10]:   
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The component uses private computation, internal communication, and 




All communication with other components is through bounded and isolated 
queues. 
TR4 The component cannot be bypassed or disabled, and has a fixed repertoire 
of essential services, such as I/O or cryptography. 
TR5 Critical functionalities of the component, such as rule checking logic, 
cannot be updated while active, and are only updatable through a 
maintenance port inaccessible to run-time networks. 
 
Satisfaction of the TRs ensures that a device can be considered trustworthy 
throughout its lifetime. To ensure TAIGA can always be trusted, special precautions must 
be met during implementation to meet the five trust requirements. TR1 ensures the 
system is free of Trojan logic and hidden errors by analyzing hardware and software 
components in the pre-deployment stage. Relatively simple software can be evaluated 
using a series of testing simulations, formal verification techniques, and prototype 
implementations. To satisfy TR1, TAIGA’s interface controller must be synthesized and 
formally analyzed using trusted tools. Because the guardian software functionality is 
relatively simple, it is able to be fully simulated and verified via static analysis. 
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While TR1 protects against errors arising internal to the system, TR2 and TR3 
deal with protecting against errors arising from external systems. TR2 protects against 
unexpected component interactions that may occur if trusted and untrusted components 
share resources. To satisfy TR2, TAIGA must utilize true resource isolation and not share 
any hardware components with other systems. Achieving this is the most straightforward 
when TAIGA is implemented on a physically separate device.  
Likewise, TR3 prohibits non-isolated communication between components which 
may allow untrusted components to introduce undesired behavior into the trusted 
components. In addition, isolated queues also safeguard the confidentiality of 
communications, which protects against API exploits such as Heartbleed. TAIGA 
satisfies TR3 because it uses dedicated, hardware-implemented queues for 
communication between devices.    
TR4 and TR5 ensure that the component is not modified from its original design 
during run-time. They require that untrusted systems cannot workaround or turn off the 
security measures of the trusted device. The requirements can be met by requiring 
physical device access in order to utilize update ports. TR4 is satisfied when the logic 
guards are implemented and each command between the primary controller and process 
must be validated. Because the only means of communication between the processor and 
the controller is through TAIGA, the device cannot be bypassed. When the guards are 
isolated in hardware logic, they can only be updated by physical access to maintenance 
ports. The maintenance ports are physically separate from run-time networks, and thus 
cannot be updated remotely, satisfying TR5 [45].     
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CHAPTER 4  
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND RESULTS 
 
To analyze TAIGA’s capabilities, TAIGA was implemented on a demonstration 
hazardous cargo-carrying robot platform. The mobile robot setup simulates several 
industrial settings such as warehouses, nuclear power plants, and gas refineries [48] [49]. 
Similar robots are also used in high-risk emergency situations such as the ones used to 
investigate the damage at the Fukushima nuclear reactor [50]. These settings frequently 
use robots to perform tasks that are undesirable or unsafe for humans, and require a high 
amount of reliability since improper operation may result in significant physical harm.  
This demonstration utilizes a small servo-controlled Jonny-Five humanoid robot sold by 
Lynxmotion as shown in Figure 4. The robot has differential drive treads and downward 
facing reflectivity sensors that were added to perform line-following. The robot tracks 
lines on the floor to move between cargo stations at the ends of the track as shown in 
Figure 5. A return ramp was added along the sides of the track so the cargo would 
automatically reset from the drop station to the retrieval station. This eliminated the need 
for a manual reset after each delivery, allowing the process to run indefinitely. The cargo 
was a mock-up flammable fuel tank fitted with a special handle for the robot to grab. The 





Figure 4: Demonstration robot and hazardous cargo 
 
 




Figure 6: Cargo demo overview video (student_kevinlyn_201507_fig6_Demo.wmv, 
224K) 
 
4.1 TAIGA Guard Design 
During its operation, the robot moves between two control states as shown in Figure 
7. The robot is in the retrieving state when it is driving forward with its hands open, 
ready to grab the cargo. Meanwhile, it makes slight velocity corrections as it performs 
forward line-following to stay on the painted path. When it detects reaching the cargo at 
the end of the path, the robot closes its claws and raises its arm to pick up the cargo, and 
transitions to the delivering state. The robot then holds onto its cargo as it traverses the 
path in reverse, until it again reaches the opposite station, where it releases the cargo and 
transitions back to the retrieving state. 
 
Figure 7: Robot states for cargo carrying operation 
 
The specification guards for the implementation are shown in Table 2. The 
specification guards prevent the motors from damaging themselves by moving at unsafe 









-Arms out  
-Claws open 
Front end of path detected  
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speeds. The operational guards, which vary depending on the state, ensure the robot is in 
the proper position to perform each task. Finally, the safety-critical check guards look for 
specific key corrective actions based on sensor data.   
Table 2: Summary of implemented guards 
Enforced  Action Value 
Specification Guards 
Always Maximum Body Servo Speed ±90 deg/sec 
Always Maximum Tread Velocity 1 m/sec 
Operational Guards 
Retrieving State Arm Servo Position Out 
Retrieving State Claw Servo Position Open 
Delivering State Arm Servo Position Up 
Delivering State Claw Servo Position Closed 
Safety-Critical Check Guards 
Front sensors off track Forward line correction performed  
Back sensors off track Reverse line correction performed 
Front end of the track reached Arms raised, claws closed 
Rear end of the track reached Arms lowered, claws opened 
 
Once an action fails a guard, the internal TAIGA back-up controller takes over the 
process. Because the control law is closed-loop and requires no information external to 
TAIGA, the backup controller provides the same functionality as the primary controller. 
While this experiment is ideally suited to demonstrate certain TAIGA components such 
as the back-up controller, it fails to utilize other functionalities, such as the prediction unit 
or vetting of controller updates.  
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4.2 TAIGA Implementation 
The demonstration utilizes two Zynq-7000 All Programmable System-on-Chip (SoC) 
ZYBO development boards as shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. The first board, outlined 
in red in Figure 9, shows the primary embedded controller. The primary controller runs a 
version of Ubuntu Linux on the board’s ARM Cortex-A9 processor, and contains the 
robot’s custom control algorithms written in C. Selected source code for key primary 
controller functions can be found in Appendix A. The controller communicates with the 
supervisory network via Ethernet. The second board, outlined in green, shows the 
hardware connections in the TAIGA implementation.  
 





Figure 9: TAIGA implementation using two separate system-on-chip (SoC) devices 
 
The two boards communicate only over a dual 32-bit bi-directional first-in-first-
out (FIFO) serializer/deserializer (SerDes) interface. The communication interfaces on 
both boards were implemented in the programmable logic from C code using Xilinx’s 
Vivado High-Level Synthesis (HLS) tool. Communication sent from the primary 
controller is then evaluated using the series of guard logic checks described previously in 
Figure 3. The logic checks were also implemented in the programmable logic using HLS. 
Once a command from the primary controller clears the logic checks, it is passed into a 
low-level controller running peripheral drivers to be executed by the robot’s servos.  
The low-level controller consists of another Arm Cortex-A9 processor running 
Free Real Time Operating System (FreeRTOS). In addition to controlling peripheral 
drivers, this processor stores sensor information, tracks the process, and provides a 
predictive model of future states and required actions in a similar fashion to the primary 
controller. The state information is readable by the logic guards, which allows the 
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dynamic operational guards to be enforced at the correct times.   Meanwhile, the process 
backup controller is ready on a bare metal application, which is an application without an 
operating system, in a MicroBlaze soft processor. When commands from the primary 
controller fail to satisfy the logical guards, the backup controller is triggered and provided 
with the state information to generate corrective action. Once this has occurred, 
commands from the primary controller will be completely ignored, and the backup 
controller will command the process.  
Table 3 shows the total configurable logic resources used on the Zynq-7000 
development board to implement TAIGA, broken up by FPGA component. The table 
includes: flip-flops (FFs), look-up tables (LUTs), block RAM (BRAM), and 16-bit shift 
register look-up tables with clock enable (SRL16E). Overall, no more than 14% of any 
component was utilized in the implementation. This is important because it shows that 
TAIGA can be implemented without requiring excessive amounts of FPGA resources. 
Furthermore, it indicates that TAIGA may be built using off the shelf FPGA boards 
which may be fairly inexpensive relative to the process being protected.  It should be 
noted that these values are specific to this implementation and will change depending on 
the complexity of other designs. 
Table 3: TAIGA implementation resource usage 
Component I/O FF LUT BRAM SRL16E 
Guardian Monitor - 456 341 3 0 
SerDes - 706 346 2 1 
Backup controller - 1787 1833 2 132 
Total Used 8 2949 2520 7 133 
Total Available 100 35200 17600 60 6000 




Table 4 shows the sources of latency added by TAIGA. The largest source of latency 
comes from the SerDes link, which requires 70 clock cycles to transfer values from the 
FIFO to the SoC. 
Table 4: TAIGA latency analysis 
Component Latency 
Component Clock Frequency Additional Clock Cycles 
 MHz Min / Max 
Monitor 150 2 / 7 
32-bit SerDes 50 or 200 35 / 35 
Timing Path Latency 
Path Worst Case Added Latency (ns) 
Linux to real-time kernel @ 50 MHz 1407 
Linux to real-time kernel @ 200 MHz 38 
Backup controller to real-time kernel 47 
 
4.3 Code Verification and Testing 
To ensure compliance with TR1, the code used in the TAIGA implementation was 
formally verified. Figure 10 shows a sample source code section defining a particular 
servo position operational guard. The range of acceptable values for the servo’s position 
depends on the robot’s state of either RETRIEVING or DELIVERING. The code 
contains ANSI/ISO C Specification Language (ACSL) annotations to perform the 
verification. The verify_all_valid and verify_any_invalid functions in line 17 were used to 
test all possible input values to the operational guards. The assumes statements in lines 10 
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and 14 provide the possible input ranges that should result in the function outputting the 
value denoted by the corresponding ensures statements. 
 
Figure 10: Frama-C verification of operational guard C code 
 
The verification of the operational guard proof was confirmed using the Alt-Ergo 
prover in Frama-C’s Jessie plugin [51]. The analysis functions disjoint behaviors and 
complete behaviors in lines 17 and 18 designate that the evaluation set of behaviors as 
complete and disjoint. When the code passed verification, this meant that all possible 
input values achieved the desired result [10]. 
While efforts were made to formally verify as much of the source code as possible, 
certain areas of the implementation could not be formally tested. For example, the backup 
controller code runs on an Arm Cortex-A9 running FreeRTOS. While the backup 
1      typedef unsigned u8; 
2      typedef unsigned u32; 
3      enum States{RETRIEVING, DELIVERING}; 
4      #define SERVO_MAX 360 
5      #define SERVO_MIN 0 
6      #define validateThreshold(value, upper, lower)  ((value >= lower && value <= upper) ? 1 : 0) 
7      // This function evaluates a servo position value against operational guards 
8      /*@assigns \result; 
9      behavior verify_all_valid: 
10       assumes ((process_state == RETRIEVING)&& ((command <= SERVO_ MAX)&& (command >= 120))) || 
11               ((process_state == DELIVERING)&& ((command <= 90)&& (command >= SERVO_ MIN))); 
12       ensures \result == 1; 
13     behavior verify_any_invalid: 
14       assumes ((process_state == RETRIEVING)&& ((command > SERVO_ MAX) || (command < 120))) || 
15               ((process_state == DELIVERING)&& ((command > 90) || (command < SERVO _MIN))); 
16       ensures \result == 0; 
17     disjoint behaviors verify_all_valid,verify_any_invalid; 
18     complete behaviors verify_all_valid,verify_any_invalid; */ 
19     u8 servoPositionOperationalGuard(u32 command, enum States process_state){ 
20      u8 retval = 0; 
21      if(process_state == RETRIEVING){ 
22       retval = validateThreshold(command, SERVO _MAX, 120);} 
23       else if(process_state == DELIVERING){ 
24       retval = validateThreshold(command, 90, SERVO _MIN);} 




controller code could be verified, the entire FreeRTOS package could not. This could be 
solved by using a simpler RTOS package that can be verified, or developing a custom 
replacement RTOS using only trusted tools. Another alternative would be to use a RTOS 
version which has been designed, tested, and certified for critical CPS use, such as 
SafeRTOS [52].  
4.4 Simulated Attacks & Results 
To test the effectiveness of TAIGA, cyber-attacks were launched resulting in each of 
the four potential outcomes, each with and without TAIGA in place. Each setup was 
tested ten times and run until the process was physically damaged, or for a maximum of 
ten minutes. The process was considered damaged when either the robot or cargo collided 
with another object, such as a wall or cargo station piece, as shown in Figure 11.   
 
Figure 11: Robot dropping the cargo as it breaks through a barrier 
 
The Controller Non-Functional effect was simulated by sending a malicious 
update to the processor. The update contained an infinite while loop in the control 
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algorithm, so the control code would stop sending commands shortly after beginning. 
Without TAIGA implemented, the robot’s motors maintained the same value when the 
controller locked-up, and continued to drive forward off the track, resulting in a collision 
with the mock explosive fuel tank. With TAIGA, however, the safety-critical command 
guards detected that the robot had reached the end of the track, but no command to 
reverse was received. The back-up controller took command and restored the process to 
normal operation. 
To test the resilience to the Controller Incorrect effect, a Trojan script was planted 
in the processor. Randomly activated once in every thirty second interval, the Trojan 
would modify the values of random variables in the control loop. Without TAIGA, the 
robot began exhibiting jerky motions or performing actions at the incorrect time. Over 
time, the random interruptions created the correct conditions for the robot to collide with 
or drop the hazardous fuel tank. With TAIGA, however, the guards quickly identified 
incorrect behavior, and engaged the backup controller. 
To determine the resilience to the Controller DoS effect, a program on the 
supervisory network sent a continuous stream of commands to drive forward at various 
speeds. Without TAIGA, the time processing the excess commands delayed sensor 
polling, making the robot unable to react to ends of the track. As a result, the robot 
quickly drove off the track and into the hazardous cargo. With TAIGA, however, the 
guards identified that the sensors were not being polled as frequently as required, and as a 
result would invoke the back-up controller.   
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For the final test, an application program interface (API) was provided to an 
intelligent hacker to simulate the Malicious Controller effect. The hacker had the ability 
to monitor sensor readings, issue any level of command, and change any available 
variable in real-time. With full access to the system, the hacker easily commanded the 
robot to throw the explosive fuel tank into a wall. With the addition of TAIGA, however, 
the hacker’s actions quickly triggered the backup controller. Because TAIGA only acts as 
a monitor during normal operation, the hacker was unaware of TAIGA’s presence until 
after it had taken control of the process. Even then, the hacker was unable to modify or 
disable TAIGA.  
Recorded results are summarized in Table 5. The first set of data shows the 
average time between the start of a cyber-attack, and when the process damaged itself 
without TAIGA. For most attacks, physical damage could be accomplished in seconds, or 
at most, minutes.  The table also shows a second set of data with TAIGA, which lists the 
average time between the start of the cyber-attack, and when the back-up controller takes 
over the process. In every case, TAIGA was able to detect the attack, and the backup 
controller was able to take control. While attacks were able to cause physical harm 
without TAIGA, they were unable to disrupt the process with TAIGA. When read 
together, the results indicate that the backup controller has enough time to restore 




Table 5: Experimental results with and without TAIGA 
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CHAPTER 5   
TAIGA GENERALIZATIONS 
 
The results presented in the previous chapter illustrate an example of TAIGA’s 
capability to maintain a process without interruption even during a cyber-attack. But the 
exact implementation of TAIGA varies depending on the process application. Certain 
aspects, such as the backup controller and specification guards, are designed using 
application-specific control algorithms and logic [45]. Furthermore, the availability of 
other features, such as the prediction unit, depends on the system configuration [10]. 
These system-specific conditions raise an important question, how can TAIGA be 
generalized to help protect any CPS? Specifically, what system-level criteria must be met 
to receive the various protection benefits offered by TAIGA? This chapter will aim to 
answer this question. The first section will begin by establishing some basic control-
theory terms and definitions used in later analysis. The second section will then provide a 
system-level categorization of TAIGA’s possible benefits. After that, various 
modifications will be proposed to the experimental setup described in the previous 
chapter, and its impact on TAIGA’s benefits will be discussed. Finally, this chapter will 
present a set of system-level criteria that determine which benefits TAIGA can provide to 
any given system.       
5.1 Control Theory Definitions 
Before beginning our analysis of TAIGA’s benefits, we define some common 
control-theory terminology that will be used in later sections. We start by defining terms 
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( 1 ) 
 
( 2 ) 
( 3 )  
 
used in conjunction with the state-space model representation of a system, commonly 
used in control design. The state-space model consists of a p x 1 input vector u(t), an n x 
1 internal state variables x(t), and a q x 1 external output variables y(t). The variables are 
related through the n x n system matrix A(t), n x p  input matrix B(t), q x n output matrix 
C(t), and q x p feedthrough matrix D(t),  as shown in equations ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) [53] . For a 
linear and time invariant (LTI) system, the system matrices are not time dependent and 
can be rewritten as A, B, C and D. 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑨𝒙(𝑡) + 𝑩𝒖(𝑡) 
𝒚(𝑡) = 𝑪𝒙(𝑡) + 𝑫𝒖(𝑡) 
 Control system engineers define a system to be controllable if the system’s 
actuators are capable of exercising control over all system states. In other words, a system 
is controllable iff ∃ u(t) s.t. x(to) can be driven to x(tf), ∀ x(to). A simple test for 
controllability can be performed by checking that the rank of the controllability matrix R, 
shown in equation ( 3 ), is equal to n, the number of system states [54]. A similar but 
weaker criterion is required for a system to be stabilizable, which allows for uncontrolled 
states if and only if those states have naturally stable dynamics. It should be noted that 
both controllability and stabilizability depend only on the relationship between the 
system dynamic and input dynamic matrices A and B, and do not account for the 
system’s ability to observe the output with its sensors. 
𝑹 = [ 𝑩 𝑨𝑩 𝑨2𝑩… 𝑨𝑛−1𝑩 ] 
If the system’s states can be determined from the output sensors, the system is 
said to be observable. This occurs if all system states x(t) impact y(t) in such a way that 
x(t) can be determined from y(t). Mathematically, this occurs when the observability 
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matrix Q shown in equation ( 4 ) has full rank [55]. If a system is not observable, it may 
be detectable if the unobservable states asymptotically decay. It should again be noted 
that observability and detectability only depend on the system dynamics and output 


















5.1.1 System with Feedback 
 Most control systems are further related through the feedback loop shown in 
Figure 12. In the figure, the reference signal r(t) represents the desired value of the output 
states. The system attempts to drive y(t) to r(t) using the feedback loop relationship 
provided by the feedback gain matrix K. As a result of the feedback relationship, u(t) can 
be computed using equation ( 5 ).   
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               Figure 12: Typical state-space feedback loop 
( 5 ) 
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 It should be noted that r(t) is generated by the high-level control law for the 
system. For remotely operated systems, such as a remotely controlled aircraft, r(t) is 
determined by the aircraft pilot’s control inputs. In truly autonomous systems, such as a 
manipulator at a factory performing repetitive tasks, r(t) may be preprogrammed ahead of 
time.  
Although feedback is focused on driving y(t) to r(t), the safety status of the 
process is often dependent on x(t). In an ideal case, the system would know the precise 
values of x(t) even under open loop conditions, unfortunately, there are very few systems 
that can operate in this fashion [56]. It is therefore critical that the system can both 
monitor and control x(t), however, equation ( 5 ) does not include an x(t) term. Recall, 
however, that y(t) and x(t) are related through equation ( 2 ), and that the x(t) terms can 
be observed and controlled if the system is completely observable and controllable.  
5.2 Categorization of TAIGA’s Benefits 
With the control-theory terms defined, we seek to relate them to TAIGA’s 
possible benefits. It is important to note that a benefit provides an observable effect to the 
system, while a feature is a capability of TAIGA used to produce a benefit. Although 
TAIGA includes several noteworthy features, its key benefits include process 
maintainability and safety. But how is “safety” defined? For each point in time, we can 
define a safety set S(t), where as long as the system states, x(t), lie within S(t), the system 
is safe. Reworded, a process is safe if x(t) ∈ S(t) [28]. We note that S(t) may be time-
varying, representing that the requirements of the system may change dynamically over 
time. For example, it may be acceptable for an autonomous automobile to travel forward 
at a given velocity, but once it detects an object ahead, it must either stop or change 
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directions. While S(t) usually does not often appear explicitly in control design, designers 
often account for restrictions placed by S(t)  in the form of constraints.    
Although a system may be safe, that does not necessarily mean it is acting as 
desired. For example, the autonomous automobile may be perfectly safe in its garage, but 
would be rather useless if it only stayed there. When operating normally, the system 
should attempt to follow the desired feasible process reference signal r*(t), though 
because no system is truly ideal, it cannot perfectly follow r*(t).  As a result, let x*(t) and 
y*(t) represent the realized results from the input u*(t), which is attempting to follow 
r*(t). It should be noted that physical errors and variations may result in different actual 
values for u*(t), x*(t), and y*(t) for the same r*(t). This is expected because u*(t), x*(t) 
and y*(t) only represent the best possible physical realization of u(t), x(t) and y(t) in the 
face the system imperfections at the time of realization. We can therefore say the process 
is maintained if the realized states x(t) = x*(t). It is important to note the feasibility 
restriction placed on r*(t). This physical restriction indicates that r*(t) must be met 
without actuator saturation [57]. 
As with any fault mitigation system, TAIGA’s responsiveness is determined by its 
ability to detect when the process is not maintained or is unsafe. If TAIGA’s specification 
guards adequately detect faults, we say TAIGA offers automatic protection. Furthermore, 
if TAIGA is equipped with a trusted warning device such as audible or visual alarms, 
TAIGA offers alarmability. If TAIGA includes a trusted manual input device, such as a 
trusted emergency stop (e-stop) switch, we say TAIGA includes manual process 
interfaces.    
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By combining and rearranging the previously discussed terms, we define three 
possible TAIGA process benefits and three possible safety benefits:  
Possible Process Benefits:  
 Automatic Process Maintainability – A cyber-attack will automatically trigger 
the backup controller which maintains the process as if no attack occurred, such 
that the realized r(t)= r*(t) ∀ t. 
 Manual Process Maintainability –TAIGA features a trusted HMI where an 
operator is able to provide r*(t) and therefor u*(t) to maintain the process. 
 Process Alarmability – TAIGA is able to automatically raise a trusted local alarm 
when process is predicted to deviate outside expected process limits such that   
|x(t) -  x*(t)| < the maximum expected process error. 
Possible Safety Benefits:  
 Automatic Safety Maintainability - A cyber-attack will automatically trigger the 
backup controller which can ensure system safety such that x(t) ∈ S(t) ∀ t. 
 Manual Safety Maintainability – The backup controller includes a manual trigger 
to switchover, and once activated can ensure system safety such that x(t) ∈ S(t) ∀ 
t if x(t) is recoverable (can be returned to S(t)) at the time of switchover [28].  
 Safety Alarmability – TAIGA is able to automatically raise a trusted local alarm 
when the system is predicated to be unsafe such that x(t) ⋶ S(t). 
Several of the terms listed above contrast from typical terminology used in 
TAIGA literature. This is because most previously discussed systems, such as the 
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experiment in Chapter 4, are ideally suited for TAIGA and therefore meet the criterion 
for highly-desirable benefits such as automatic process maintainability. In such a context, 
the discussion focuses on the single maximum achievable benefit, and ignores other 
benefits that may be more applicable to other systems.  
For example, Automatic process maintainability is not possible on systems that 
are not fully autonomous, yet TAIGA can provide other benefits to non-autonomous 
systems. For example, it may be desirable for an industrial plant to implement TAIGA 
only as a trusted cyber-attack alarm which notifies plant personal who can stabilize the 
system using mechanical interlocks [58]. Similarly, in the event of an unexpected 
emergency due to a cyber-attack, a system operator may wish to manually activate 
TAIGA to reduce process load without shutting off power to the entire system. For 
example, during a cyber-attack, the emergency stop button on a full-sized humanoid 
mobile robot could activate TAIGA’s trusted backup controller to freeze the robot’s 
actions while still preventing the robot from falling over [59].      
But the question remains: what are the system requirements to achieve the certain 
benefits listed above? In the next section, we modify the experiment in Chapter 4 to see 
how the system’s eligible benefits change depending on the system configuration.     
5.3 System Configuration Affects on Eligible Benefits 
Throughout its development, the refined experiment presented in Chapter 4 
underwent several major revisions and variations. One such version involved a flag 
signaling scenario, where the robot raised a specific flag upon user request, while 
rejecting malicious commands to raise an incorrect flag in the other opposite hand. A 
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second setup involved a similar hazardous-cargo transportation setup, but called for three 
cargo stations, two colors of tape, and nineteen control states. Both setups are described 
in greater detail in Appendix B. Furthermore, others pursued additional implementations 
of TAIGA that have been evaluated using a cognitive radio [44], simulated aircraft pitch 
controller [21], simulated PID controller [45], and inverted pendulum [60] [61].  During 
the development of these experiments, it was realized that the benefits of TAIGA change 
depending on how the scenario is built. Specifically, the benefits change based on the 
location and capabilities of the sensors, actuators, control laws, and trusted HMIs. We 
can therefore generate interesting thought experiments by adding, removing, or 
rearranging these components in the experimental setup previously mentioned in Chapter 
4.  
5.3.1 Robot Model  
In order to guarantee any level process control, we assume the sensors and 
actuators that are connected only to TAIGA and are fairly simple devices without 
significant capacity to execute cyber-attacks of their own [62]. Additional research is 
required before interconnected or more complex embedded devices can be added to 
TAIGA. Although a cyber-attack is not expected to originate from these devices, physical 
device failure is still possible. There are many studies on designing sufficient system 
redundancies to guard against physical failures [63] [64], but since they do not affect the 
cyber-defenses provided by TAIGA, they are not discussed here. We also note that, 
although TAIGA has a prediction unit, the model still relies on sensor feedback to bound 
the prediction unit drift error. While the prediction unit has many important uses, it 
cannot be used as a trusted sensor substitute. 
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In addition to assuming a cyber-attack will not originate from the sensors and 
actuators interfacing only with TAIGA, we also assume attackers do not have physical 
device access. If attackers had device access, they would have more direct methods to 
damage the process, and are therefore a different threat than a pure cyber-attack. Physical 
access also includes access to trusted local switches and interfaces connected only to 
TAIGA.  
The experiment in Chapter 4 utilized sixteen decoupled motors, resulting in a 
thirty-two variable state vector defined by the motor positions and their corresponding 
velocities. The resulting state-space model would have sparse A, B and C matrices, and a 
zero D matrix. Despite the model’s complexity, the states are grouped into sixteen 
independent pose state pairs. Because of the independent nature of the states, changing a 
sensor or actuator will affect at most one pair of pose states, so the remaining unaffected 
states can therefore be ignored in the discussion. For simplicity, we include only the 
servos states of significance: the robot’s forward translation pose, the arm servo’s angular 
pose, and the claw servo’s angular pose.  The state-space representation of the robot is 
shown in equation ( 6 ).  
Let  𝑥1 be the robot’s forward translational position, 𝑥2 be the arm servo’s angular 
position, and  𝑥3 the claw servo’s angular position. The related velocities are 𝑥4 = ?̇?1, 
𝑥5 = ?̇?2, and  𝑥6 = ?̇?3. The motors’ angular acceleration, ?̇?4, ?̇?5, and ?̇?6, are controlled by 
the command inputs  𝑢1, 𝑢2, and  𝑢3 respectively. Because the positions are observed by 
the sensors, let  𝑦1 = 𝑐11𝑥1 , 𝑦2 = 𝑐22𝑥2 , and 𝑦3 = 𝑐33𝑥3 , where  𝑐11 , 𝑐22 , and  𝑐33  are 
non-zero scaling constants.  
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The model assumes the motors are sufficiently geared such that the robot will not 
move on the horizontal surface without actively being driven, and the claw will not 
passively open or close. Nonlinear effects such as friction as well as linear effects such as 
spring constants and damping are relatively small and are ignored. The arms, however, 
experience a significant gravitational force when raised, and therefore  𝑎52  signifies a 
linear approximation of the gravitational force returning the arms to their lowered resting 
position.    
The configuration presented in Figure 13 shows a detailed hardware setup of the 
experiment performed in Chapter 4. Note that all sensors and actuators are connected 
directly to TAIGA. In addition, TAIGA can select between two input signals: an external 
u_controller, which originates from the untrusted primary controller, or an internal u*, 
which originates from TAIGA’s own trusted model of the process controller. Because the 
process in the experiment was entirely autonomous, TAIGA has been preprogrammed 
with an internal r*_TAIGA and set of control laws which should be nearly identical to r* 
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used in the primary controller’s control laws. With knowledge of r* and the control laws, 
TAIGA can internally determine u*. 
 
Figure 13: Original system configuration 
 
Performing the observability and controllability rank test on equation ( 6 ), the 
system is both completely observable and completely controllable. Furthermore, TAIGA 
is preprogramed with trusted internal r*_TAIGA, which it can use to generate u*(t). This 
setup therefore receives accurate state information, contains sufficient process knowledge 
to internally determine u*(t), and has sufficient trusted actuators to perform the desired 
action. In this case, TAIGA can both detect and automatically correct for excessive 
deviations in u(t) from u*(t).  We can therefore say that the setup mentioned in Chapter 4 
has Automatic Safety Maintainability and Automatic Process Maintainability. The 
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It should be noted that although the setup can automatically maintain and protect 
itself, it lacks the required HMI components to satisfy either the Manual Process 
Maintainability or the Manual Safety Maintainability requirements. This implies that 
only a violation of the specification guards can trigger the backup controller, and a 
nearby human operator would have no direct ability to request an emergency backup 
controller switch.  In addition, because a well-designed attack may involve a stealth 
component, the primary controller may be modified to ignore any alarms generated by 
TAIGA. Without additional trusted alarm components, the setup fails to satisfy either the 
Process Alarmability or Safety Alarmability requirements. As a result, a nearby operator 
may not realize TAIGA has taken process control until they notice TAIGA rejecting 
commands from the primary controller.   
5.3.2 Sensor & E-Stop Placement 
Consider the proposed modification shown in Figure 14. The setup is similar to 
Figure 13; however the locally connected reflectivity sensor which previously provided 
the output reading y1 was replaced with an externally connected acoustic ping sensor 
fixed to one end of the track. While the same state information can be read for both 
sensors, the acoustic sensor is connected to the process controller through the supervisory 
network, and does communicate directly through TAIGA. Although this setup for the 
robot experiment seems unnecessarily complex, the setup closely resembles many CPSes 
that cover large geographic areas or require remotely placed sensor nodes.  For example, 
some modern agricultural irrigation systems use feedback from remote sensors that 
measure evapotranspiration and other environmental field parameters [65]. Because the 
network or process controller may contain malware affecting the sensor values, the 
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external sensor is untrusted. Although control-theory research has identified methods to 
deal with sensor delays, packet loss, or data-injection [66] [67], they rely on either using 
redundant sensors, or on some form of correct information eventually arriving at the 
controller. Because an attack on the sensor, controller, or network may prevent any 
accurate information from ever reaching the controller, the sensor must be ignored 
entirely from within TAIGA. This results in  𝑐11  = 0, with the modified output now 
shown in equation ( 7 ).  A quick observability calculation reveals that this system is no 
longer observable or detectable within TAIGA as x1 was only observable through y1, and 
x1 is not a naturally bounded state. As a result, TAIGA cannot provide any significant 
benefits to this system since it does not have the information required to determine an 
accurate y(t) or x(t).   
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Figure 15: Configuration able to provide limited benefits due to untrusted sensor y2 
 
The next configuration is presented in Figure 15. Instead of a position encoder 
internal to TAIGA, the system now receives arm positioning information using a set of 
active inferred reflection sensors fixed along track. At first glance, this setup appears 
nearly identical to the previous setup in Figure 14. With the external sensor untrusted, the 
new setup’s C matrix is shown in equation ( 8 ). Upon analysis, however, we note that the 
unobservable states  𝑥2 and  𝑥5 will decay to a natural stable resting position if no input is 
received. This means that the system is detectable within TAIGA. If the process reference 
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( 8 )  
 
TAIGA cannot observe if x2 and x5 are within the safety set S. Without knowledge of the 
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But if the process signal r*(t) calls for the inputs impacting the unobserved states 
uunobservable*(t)=0 ∀ t, then the unobservable system will stabilize naturally over time. If 
the unobserved state naturally stays within S(t) ∀ t and uunobservable(t)=0 ∀ t , then those 
states may be considered always safe. Because the unobservable states are safe, and the 
observable state can be monitored and corrected, the system is eligible for Automatic 
Safety Maintainability.  
The setup is again modified as shown in Figure 16. The setup is identical to the 
previous setup, except a local simple external physical emergency stop switch has been 
added which invokes the TAIGA backup controller. Such switches are especially 
common on autonomous vehicles and mobile robots where simply disconnecting device 
power is insufficient to bring the device to a safe state [59] [68]. Because TAIGA has 
direct access to the simple analog switch, and the switch is not networked with any other 
device, it is assumed that a cyber-attack will not originate from the switch. The switch 
does not change equation ( 8 ), and our previous analysis that the system is detectable still 
holds. The addition of the switch, however, means that a local operator may identify 
undesirable or unsafe system behavior, and activate the e-stop switch. Since the system is 
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detectable, by cutting off any inputs to the unobservable states, those states will self-
stabilize to their natural stable value. If this stable value lies within S(t) ∀ t, then TAIGA 
can restore system safety and move all values within S(t). It can therefore be said that 
TAIGA offers Manual Safety Maintainability. TAIGA may still offer Automatic Safety 
Maintainability if it satisfies the uunobservable*(t)=0 ∀ t discussed in the previous setup. 
 
Figure 16: Configuration able to provide manual benefits due to a switchover trigger  
 
5.3.3 Actuator Placement 
Figure 17 presents an actuator modification to the originally discussed system. 
The figure shows the tread motors, which originally connected to TAIGA, instead 
connected to the process controller via the supervisory network. While this setup again 
appears impractical for the robot application, the setup models many CPSes which 
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power station relies on many auxiliary systems, such as cooling water and seal oil, whose 
valves and pumps may be physically distant from the actual generator [69].  Because the 
motor lies outside of TAIGA, it is untrusted and completely vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
Because TAIGA can no longer control the motor through a trusted connection, 𝑏41 is 
replaced with a zero as shown in equation ( 9 ). Furthermore, because the actuator is 
vulnerable, an attacker may take control and provide malicious inputs, indicated by the 
malicious control vector m(t). The malicious inputs are affected by the malicious input 
dynamics represented by the matrix N. Because the attacker can disrupt or destroy the 
process, TAIGA cannot provide any benefits in this configuration. 
 











states: x2, x5 
Sensor 
y2 u3 y3 
Motor 
Claw-related 






Process Controller (Untrusted) 





























0 0 0 𝑎14 0 0
0 0 0 0 𝑎25 0
0 0 0 0 0 𝑎36
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 𝑎52 0 0 0 0


































































Figure 18: Configuration with competing untrusted and trusted actuators 
 
We next consider a modified version of the previous configuration in Figure 18. 
The revised setup calls for multiple motors inside the tread, with one motor connected to 
TAIGA, and the other to the supervisory network. This setup may be common in plants 
that require high availability and use multiple redundant devices. The state-space matrix 
is similar to the previous setup, however, TAIGA still has trusted control over all states, 
as shown in equation ( 10 ). To maintain safety, however, TAIGA’s trusted actuators 
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( 10 )  
 
maintained if ∃ a feasible u(t) s.t. x(t) ∈ S(t) ∀ feasible m(t). If this condition is met, the 
configuration can satisfy Automatic Safety Maintainability. Similarly, the system satisfies 
the requirements for Automatic Process Maintainability iff ∃ a feasible u(t) s.t. |x(t) -  
x*(t)| < the maximum expected process error ∀ feasible m(t) and t. Special attention 
should be given to the feasibility constraint, since the actuators may quickly saturate 
while trying to counter-act one another. Furthermore, even though the system’s safety or 
process may be maintained, significant additional energy may be consumed by the 
competing actuators. The criteria for maintainability have no implication for power 
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5.3.4 Operator Alarm & HMI Placement 
The configuration in Figure 19 is very similar to the original setup, showing all 
sensors and actuators connected directly to TAIGA. The difference is that Figure 19 
features an alarm, implemented using a red LED, and is locally connected to TAIGA. 
Because the alarm is only accessible through TAIGA and is a simple device, it is 
assumed to be protected from cyber-attacks. Because the system is again completely 
observable and the reference generator is internal to TAIGA, TAIGA is aware if the 
system is deviating from the programmed process. Because TAIGA can raise an external 





Figure 19: Configuration able to raise a local visual trusted  
 
The configuration in Figure 20 again features a subtle change where the control 
laws have slightly changed. Whereas the previous setup was completely autonomous, the 
new setup features process reference signals unknown to TAIGA. For example, while the 
previous robot setup continuously retrieved and delivered cargo from the same stations, 
the setup in Figure 20 may instead be programmed to wait for a remote operator to drive 
the robot to a previously unknown pick-up station. This configuration resembles many 
remotely operated devices, such as surgical robots used to perform tele-operated surgery 
[70]. The process reference signals r*(t) is now dependent on external system knowledge, 
and is not known internally to TAIGA. In this case, the process is dependent on the 
external rcontroller(t), which in the event of cyber-attack, may be untrusted. Since the 
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Safety Maintainable, though it lacks sufficient internal information to autonomously 
maintain the process.    
 
 
Figure 20: Configuration lacking process knowledge and therefor process protection 
 
Another final configuration is shown in Figure 21. This configuration is still 
unable to internally generate the process reference signal r*(t), however, TAIGA is 
equipped with a local analog HMI not networked to another device. Even in the absence 
of local operator commands u_HMI(t), the process can still be remotely operated with 
guaranteed Automatic Safety Maintainability. If a local operator were to provide a trusted 
input u_HMI(t), which differed from the untrusted u_Controller(t), TAIGA would select the 
trusted signal u_HMI(t). Similarly, if uController(t) halted the process by attempting to drive 
to an unsafe state, the process could be safely resumed if a local operator physically 
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for Manual Process Maintainability. It should be noted, however, that although u_HMI(t) 
comes from a local operator, it still must undergo the same specification and operational 
guards as u_Controller(t).Therefore even though the HMI requires physical access, it does 
not provide a bypass to the TAIGA safety protections.   
 
 
Figure 21: Configuration using a local human interface for process knowledge 
 
5.4 TAIGA Benefits Eligibility Criteria  
In the preceding sections, minor modifications to the setup architecture resulted in 
various different effects to the list of eligible benefits. In some setups, benefits could only 
be received if the state dynamics, control laws, and components satisfied certain 
conditions.  Although an exhaustive list of all possible system configurations was not 
presented, most other configurations can be described using a combination of the 
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determined for any LTI CPS using the combinational logic circuit presented in Figure 22. 
In the figure, the actuator conditions are represented by tan inputs, the sensor and backup 
controller trigger switch conditions are represented by blue inputs, and control law and 
HMI conditions are represented by purple inputs. From the figure, it is clear that the 
various benefits depend on several system-level criteria which may not be immediately 
obvious. While the diagram does not account for all possible scenarios such as 
restrictions on the availability of S, or setups involving a TAIGA system of systems, the 




Figure 22: Logic diagram relating system properties to eligible TAIGA benefits 
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CHAPTER 6   
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This thesis explored current CPS adversaries and cyber-attack vectors, and 
defined four possible attack outcomes on a process controller. The discussed TAIGA 
scheme can defend against these outcomes, while satisfying the trust requirements. The 
effectiveness of TAIGA was confirmed by the results of an implementation on a robot 
simulating cargo-carrying operations. Next, the benefits of TAIGA were categorized, and 
system eligibility criteria for each benefit were deduced by analyzing possible 
modifications the robot experiment. Finally, other CPS security techniques and previous 
TAIGA papers were discussed. 
From the experimental evidence presented, it can be concluded that TAIGA can 
defend against the four cyber-attack outcomes in certain applications. In addition, this 
thesis showed that TAIGA may provide up to six different possible benefits to a CPS. 
Using the presented eligibility criteria to determine available benefits, TAIGA’s 
suitability to any CPS can be easily decided before implementation. As applications of 
CPSes continue to grow, more solutions similar to TAIGA will be required to prevent 
cyber-attacks from inflicting physical harm. 
Although TAIGA has evolved significantly since its introduction, the areas of 
additional future research and work are listed below: 
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 Additional implementations of TAIGA would provide useful experimental 
data regarding effectiveness, capabilities, and drawbacks. Possible platforms 
include more embedded systems, such as a motor controller on an industrial 
control system testbed. Another interesting implementation may be done using 
autonomous cars and aircraft, where obstacle avoidance and safety are a 
priority.   
 TAIGA’s scalability to large networks should be studied in greater detail from 
a system of systems perspective. Specifically, it should be determined what 
conditions must be met for a series of TAIGA protected devices to provide 
protection to an overall interconnected system.    
 To meet the bandwidth requirements of systems involving a large number of 
components, larger-scale versions of TAIGA will need to utilize multiple 
parallel communication channels. Work will be needed to modify the 
specification guards to allow them to evaluate the effects of multiple 
simultaneous commands on a system.  
 Current TAIGA prototypes are custom built, and as in the case of the robot 
experiment, use custom designs and communication protocols. If TAIGA is to 
be a cost-competitive security solution, significant work is required to reduce 
the implementation cost. This could be done by offering an easy to install 
version of TAIGA that interfaces with common communication adapters and 
protocols.   
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 A formal procedure for determining the safety and operational guards for any 
system should be established. This is a similar problem to determining the 
criteria for safety set S.    
 The current TAIGA benefits criteria are only applicable to LTI systems. 
Additional research will be required to expand the criteria to more complex 




APPENDIX A: PRIMARY CONTROLLER SOURCE CODE  
 
Although the full C source code for the primary controller involves multiple files 
totaling several hundred lines of code, some sample functions are included here to 
represent the type of code written for this experiment. Figure 23 shows the low-level 
communication functions that handled messages to and from the SerDes communication 
queues. These include the bit-level functions such as send_bits, request_bits, and 
get_bits. Figure 24 shows the basic core functions which initialize and poll the sensors, 
and set servo positions. These functions include: start_sensors, get_sensors, and 
rotate_servo. Figure 25 shows the source code for an implementation of the robot’s 
control state machine previously described in Figure 7. This section of code is a snippet 
from the main control loop, which runs continuously as the experiment is running. Figure 
26 shows the UI_command function called by the main control loop whenever a 
command from the real-time user interface was detected. The UI only communicated 
with the controller via a string placed in a designed text file, so the controller was 
required to parse and execute the request. Possible UI inputs included: directly calling 





Figure 23: Controller code showing low-level plant communication functions 
//   *************** Function: Send Bits ******************* 
//   Sends 32 bits message over the SerDes link to the plant. Commands are sent using the following form:  
//  [4-bit command][4-bit device select ID][12-bit parameter #1][12-bit parameter #2] 
int send_bits(unsigned int command_select, unsigned int device_select, unsigned int parameter_value1, unsigned int 
parameter_value2){ 
int return_value; 
//Validate that all parameter values are within acceptable ranges    
if (command_select <= 15 && device_select <= 15 && parameter_value1 <= 4095 && parameter_value2 <=4095){   
    //Shift and add bits in the correct order to create the 32-bit message  
    u32 value_to_send =(command_select << 28)+(device_select << 24)+(parameter_value1 << 12)+(parameter_value2); 
    //Add the value to the SerDes queue to be sent to the plant 
    return_value = enqueue(value_to_send);    
    if (return_value != 0) printf("RUNTIME ERROR: send_bits(), enqueue failure \n"); 




//If parameters are invalid, print a warning and prevent the values from being sent to the plant  





//   *************** Function: Request Bits ************* 
//   Sends a 32 bit message to the plant requesting specific information. Request use the form: 
//  [4-bits command = 0xD][7-bit tag response ID][21-bit sensor IO ID] 
int request_bits(u32 device_ID, u32 message_id){ 
//check that all parameter values are within valid ranges  
if (device_ID < 2097151 && message_id < 128){ 
    //shift and add bits to create a 32-bit message  
    u32 value_to_send = (13 << 28) + (message_id << 21) + (device_ID);  
    //Add the value to the SerDes queue to be sent to the plant 
    enqueue(value_to_send);  
return(0); 
} 
//If parameters are invalid, print a warning and prevent the values from being sent to the plant  




//   *************** Function: Get Bits ******************* 
// Takes in u32 pointers for the message tag ID and data value. The function will "return" the message  
// tag ID and value of the next message in the queue by placing them in the given pointers.  
//Responses take the form: [4-bit = 0xF][7-bit tag ID specified in request_bits()][21-bit data] 
int get_bits(u32 *message_id, u32 *value){ 
u32 rcv = 0;  
//Check the incoming SerDes messages queue and return nothing if queue is empty  
if (dequeue(&rcv, 0) != 0)return(1);   
    //Remove the leading 0xF  
    rcv = rcv - 0xF0000000;  
    //Pull out the message tag ID 
    *message_id = rcv >> 21;  
    //Pull out the data value accompanying the tag  







Figure 24: General sensor and servo controller code functions 
 
 
//   *************** Function: start_sensors() ******************* 
// Initializes the sensors by requesting information from each.  
// Must be called at the start of the program or get_sensor() will not function properly.   
int start_sensors(){ 
u32 rcv = 0; 
//Wait for the SerDes queue to clear before sending  
while (dequeue(&rcv, 0) == 0){;} 
request_bits(RIGHT_LINE_DEV_ID, RIGHT_LINE_MSG_ID);                       // Request bits from the right line sensor 
request_bits(LEFT_LINE_DEV_ID, LEFT_LINE_MSG_ID);                             // Request bits from the left line sensor  
request_bits(BACK_RIGHT_LINE_DEV_ID, BACK_RIGHT_LINE_MSG_ID);//Request bits from the back right sensor  
request_bits(BACK_LEFT_LINE_DEV_ID, BACK_LEFT_LINE_MSG_ID);    // Request bits from the back left sensor  





//   *************** Function: get_sensor() ******************* 
int get_sensor(double *right, double *left, double *back_right, double *back_left){ 
// Takes in pointers to doubles representing the values of the current sensors.  
// If a new value is available in the queue, the correct variable will be modified to  
// reflect the new value. It will then request new data from the sensor which data was received.  
int return_value = 0; 
u32 message_id; 
u32 value; 
//Loop as long as there are incoming messages available  
while (get_bits(&message_id, &value) == 0){  
//Check is a specific sensor reading is available. If so, read it, and request the sensor to read again 
if (message_id == RIGHT_LINE_MSG_ID){*right = value; request_bits(RIGHT_LINE_DEV_ID,RIGHT_LINE_MSG_ID);} 
  else if(message_id == LEFT_LINE_MSG_ID){*left = value; request_bits(LEFT_LINE_DEV_ID, LEFT_LINE_MSG_ID);} 
  else if(message_id == BACK_LEFT_ID){*back_left = value; request_bits(BACK_LEFT_ID, BACK_LEFT_ID);} 
  else if(message_id == BACK_RIGHT_ID){*back_right = value; request_bits(BACK_RIGHT_ID, BACK_RIGHT_ID);} 






//  *************** Function: Rotate Servo (GENERAL) ******************* 
// Called by other "Rotate" functions. Takes in the servo ID number, desired angle, and desired rate. 
// Checks for valid values, and converts values to match the send_bits() notation  
void rotate_servo(int servo_number, double angle, double rate_percent){ 
//Check and adjust for improper calls 
if (angle>180) {angle = 180; printf("WARNING: Servo value over 180, setting to 180\n");}  
if (angle<0) {angle = 0; printf("WARNING: Servo value under 0, setting to 0\n");} 
if (rate_percent>100) {rate_percent = 100; printf("WARNING: Servo speed over 100%%, setting to 100%% \n");}  
if (rate_percent<5) {rate_percent = 5; printf("WARNING: Servo speed under 5%%, setting to 5%% \n");} 
//Convert message to values used by the servo controllers (500 = -90 deg, 2500 = +90 deg) 






Figure 25: Main controller code showing the robot's action state machine 
 
// STATE 1: Driving forward, looking to grab the cargo 
if (state== RETRIEVING){  
// If both front sensors read white, robot may be at the end of the track. Increment transition_tick.    
        if (((right_line < S_THRESHOLD) && (left_line < S_THRESHOLD)) && new_data) transition_tick ++; 
// If both front sensors don’t read white, set transition tick back to 0. 
        else if (new_data) transition_tick = 0; 
// If transition_tick >= 2, the robot has read all white sensors multiple times, and is sure it is at the track’s end.   
// Requiring multiple sensor reads reduces the possibility of a false positive 
        if (transition_tick >= 2 && state_change_permit){ 
 transition_tick = 0; 
 // Perform the servo operations associated with transitioning states. 
 ang_vel = 90; set_angular_velocity(ang_vel, 100);  
 lin_vel = desired_reverse_vel;  
 set_linear_velocity(lin_vel, 100); 
 rotate_left_claw(180, 100); 
 rotate_right_claw(180, 100); 
 rotate_left_shoulder(180, 100); 
 rotate_right_shoulder(180, 100); 
 state= DELIVERING; 
        } 
} 
 
// STATE 2: Driving backwards, looking to deliver  the cargo 
if (state== DELIVERING){  
// If both back sensors read black, robot may be at the end of the track. Increment transition_tick.    
        if (((back_right_line >= THRESHOLD_UPPER) && (back_left_line >= THRESHOLD_UPPER)) && new_data) 
transition_tick ++; 
// If both front sensors don’t read black, set transition tick back to 0. 
        else if (new_data) transition_tick = 0; 
// If transition_tick >= 3, the robot has read all black sensors multiple times, and is sure it is at the track’s end.   
// Requiring multiple sensor reads reduces the possibility of a false positive 
        if (transition_tick >= 3 && state_change_permit){  
 transition_tick = 0; 
 // Perform the servo operations associated with transitioning states. 
 ang_vel = 90; set_angular_velocity(ang_vel, 100); lin_vel = desired_forward_vel; 
set_linear_velocity(lin_vel, 100); 
 rotate_left_claw(45, 100); 
 rotate_right_claw(45, 100); 
 rotate_left_shoulder(90, 100); 
 rotate_right_shoulder(90, 100); 
 state= RETRIEVING; 








Figure 26: User interface function code called by the main controller  
//  ********************** Function: UI_Command ************************** 
// Reads in the user's input string, parses it, and calls a function if syntax is valid 
int UI_Command(char input_str[MAX_BUF], int *state, int *timer, int *exit_tick, int *ang_vel, int *lin_vel,  
        int *desired_forward_vel, int *desired_reverse_vel,     int *new_data, int *transition_tick,  
        double *left_line, double *right_line, double *back_left_line, double *back_right_line){  
//par, par2, par3, are temporary variables which containe parsed sections of the input string  
char * par;  char * par2;   char * par3; 
int command = 0; //command corresponds to the ID number of which command (ex rotate _torso() ) will be called  
double input_val1 = 0; //temporary variables to store converted strings to double parameter values  
double input_val2 = 0; 
 
par = strtok (input_str, " ,.-"); // parse the input string and store the result in par 
// compare the first parameter with valid command calls, and set the command variable if a valid match is found.  
command = 0;  
if(strcmp(par, "head")==0){command = 1;} 
if(strcmp(par, "torso")==0){command = 2;} 
 ⁞ 
if(strcmp(par, "set_var")==0){command =16;} 
if(strcmp(par, "print")==0){command =17;} 
 
// ***Parsing and Error Checking*** 
//Check that the first parameter matches a command, otherwise return error.  
if(command == 0){printf("Invalid Command Format. For a list of commands, type \"help\" \n"); return(0);}  
//Get the input second parameter 
par2 = strtok (NULL, " ,.-");  
//Check that the second parameter is not empty  
if (par2 == NULL){printf("Invalid Command Format. For a list of commands, type \"help\" \n"); return(0);}   
//Convert from string to number if the second parameter should be a number (commands 1-15)         
if(command < 16){input_val1=atof (par2);} 
//If the command has a third parameter (commands 1-13, 16), get the third parameter 
if (command != 14 && command != 15 && command != 17){         
        par3 = strtok (NULL, " ,.-");  
        //Check that the third parameter is not empty:          
        if (par3 == NULL) {printf("Invalid Command Format. For a list of commands, type \"help\" \n"); return(0);}     
        //Convert the third parameter from string to number 
        input_val2= atof (par3);  
} //end third parameter if  
 
// Call the correct command based on the input parameters 
switch(command){  
case 1 : rotate_head(input_val1, input_val2); break; 
 ⁞ 
case 15 : set_angular_velocity(input_val1, 100); break; 
case 16 : //for command 16, “set_var”, search through possible adjustable variables for a match    
        if(strcmp(par2, "state")==0){printf("Setting state to %d \n", (int)input_val2); *state = input_val2; break;} 
  ⁞ 
        else if(strcmp(par2, "desired_reverse_vel")==0){printf("Setting desired_reverse_vel to %d \n", (int)input_val2); 
*desired_reverse_vel = input_val2; break;} 
// For case 17, “print,”  print all known variable values to the terminal 
case 17 : printf("Program Values: state %d, timer %d, exit_tick %d \n", *state, *timer, *exit_tick,);  
            ⁞ 
printf("RIGHT_LINE: %f   LEFT_LINE: %f   \n", *right_line, *left_line); break;      
} 
} 





APPENDIX B: OTHER TAIGA EXPERIMENTAL SETUPS  
 
 During the final experiment’s development, two other main setups were tested. 
These experiments included a flag-waving setup, and a variation of the hazardous cargo-
carrying setup.  
B.1 Flag Waving Setup 
The flag waving experiment was a simple setup where the robot remained 
stationary while holding a “good” and “bad” flag. The primary controller allowed a user 
to send commands to wave the good flag. The user could also, however, activate malware 
that would sporadically send commands to raise the bad flag. TAIGA would prevent such 
actions, and would illuminate a red LED to alert the user of the attack. In this situation, 
malicious commands were rejected by TAIGA, however, they did not automatically 
trigger the backup controller. This is because TAIGA still required process information 
from the primary controller as to when the good flag should be raised. To test the backup 
controller, a switch was interfaced directly with TAIGA. When triggered, this switch 
invoked the backup controller, which would raise the good flag at pre-determined 




B.2 Variation of the Hazardous Cargo Delivery Setup 
 
Figure 27: Variation of the hazardous cargo delivery setup 
 
Figure 27 shows a variation of the hazardous-cargo delivery experimental setup. 
The experiment is similar to the one discussed in Chapter 4, however, it uses a different 
station mechanism, two colors of tape, and different control laws. Instead of using a 
ramped return mechanism, the cargo had to be carried back and forth between both 
stations. The simulated hazardous cargo consisted of a 5x5x6 inch box with a 16 inch 
piece of 1.5” PVC pipe running through the center. The PVC provided a gripping surface 
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for the robot’s arms. Funnels were attached to both ends of the PVC pipe, which properly 
centered the cargo when dropped at each station. The stations were built using painted 
PVC as shown in Figure 28. To provide positioning information, green and black tape 
markings were arranged in four zones.  
 
Figure 28: Cargo drop station 
Because the robot preforms a series of complex actions in a sequence, the robot 
utilized different sets of control laws in each step. The set of control laws, which 
determines robot’s direction, line-following algorithm, and arm positioning, was 
determined by the value of a status variable. The status variable follows a state machine 
that describes the robot’s behavior with respect to the overall process as shown in Table 






indicates the robot has moved into a new physical zone, or by a timer, which indicates the 
time required for a specific action is complete.   
 
Table 6: Robot control law at each status point 
Status Control Law State Information 
Variable Action Tracking Hands Direction Location State 
Transition 
Trigger 
0 Waiting for 
signal to 
start 
None Don’t Care Stopped Rear Black Network 
Signal 
1 Grab Cargo 
from Station 
1 
Forward Don’t Care Forward Rear Black Green Tape 
2 Forward Don’t Care Forward Mid Green Black Tape 










5 Drop Cargo 
at Station 2 
None Grabbing Stopped Front Green Timer 
6 Reverse Holding Reverse Front Green Black Tape 
7 Reverse Holding Reverse Forward 
Black 
Green Tape 
8 Wait at 
starting 
location 
None Dropping Stopped Mid Green Timer 
9 Reverse Locked Up Reverse Mid Green Black Tape 
10 Grab Cargo 
from Station 
2 
None Ready to 
Grab 
Stopped Rear Black Timer 
11 None Ready to 
Grab 
Forward Rear Black Green 
12 Forward Ready to 
Grab 
Forward Mid Green Black 
13 Drop Cargo 
at Station 1 
None Grabbing Stopped Mid Black Timer 
14 Forward Holding Forward Forward 
Black 
Green Tape 
15 Wait at 
starting 
location 
None Dropping Stopped End Green Timer 
16 Reverse Locked Up Reverse End Green Black Tape 
17 Reverse Don’t Care Reverse Mid Black Green Tape 
18 Reverse Don’t Care Reverse Mid Green Black Tape 
 
In this setting, the backup controller returns the hazardous cargo to its original station, 
and resets the robot to its starting location. A red LED provides a physical indication that 
the backup controller has taken over the system. Control is only restored to the primary 
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control through a physical hardware reset of the Zybo board. Since the backup controller 
is a modified simpler version of the primary control, the backup controller required 
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